CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?
THE USE OF FORCE TO IMPOSE
DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTHURIAN
DILEMMA IN THE MODERN ERA
SCOTT THOMPSON∗
Every impulse to protect the weak and help the infirm is noble. The impulse to use the
means at our disposal to liberate a people from a government that poses no imminent or
prospective threat to us, but is so despotic, violent, and vicious that those suffering under
it cannot shake it off, is also noble. The action that gives effect to that impulse may
sometimes be internationally lawful. It may sometimes be feasible. It is often—but not
1
always—misconceived.
W. Michael Reisman, Professor of Law, Yale Law School

I
INTRODUCTION
Anyone familiar with the ancient lore surrounding King Arthur, Merlyn,
and the Knights of the Round Table is probably also familiar with the nascent
king’s struggle with whether “might makes right.”2 After a Socratic discussion
with his teacher Merlyn, Arthur, the idealistic student, rejects the famous
aphorism and determines that the converse is true—right makes might. Or at
least that it should be true. But the strength of Arthur’s conviction is put to the
test when his beloved wife Guenever is wooed away to France by Sir Lancelot.
Once something he desires is at stake, Arthur reneges on his previous
conviction and uses force to exact vengeance on Lancelot and the French.
Arthur’s struggle is one that continues today on a much larger stage and
with much larger stakes. In contemporary parlance, the question of whether
might makes right translates into the geopolitical question of whether it is
acceptable and desirable to impose democracy by force. Does the ability to
nation-build give one the right to do so? Does the end justify the means?
The saliency and complexity of the contemporary debate over whether
nations should use force, an often-condemned means, to establish democracy, a
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generally lauded end, can be evinced by the self-conflicting statements of the
most prominent U.S. leaders. Before being elected President, George W. Bush
vocally denounced the practice of nation-building.3 In one stump speech after
another during the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush declared, “I don’t think
our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building.”4 He criticized Al
Gore, stating, “I’m worried about an opponent who uses nation-building and
the military in the same sentence.”5 But in one of the more famous “flip-flops”
in recent political history, once in office and confronted with an array of
daunting foreign-policy challenges, President Bush became an active nationbuilder.6 The President used force to bring the Taliban to its knees and create a
fledgling democracy in Afghanistan. He then invaded Iraq with the end goal of
establishing a democracy there, as well.7 Similarly contradictory sentiments have
been expressed by presidential hopeful Senator Barack Obama, who declared
that “we should be more modest in our belief that we can impose democracy on
a country through military force. . . . [W]e should be clear that the institutions of
democracy—free markets, a free press, a strong civil society—cannot be built
overnight, and they cannot be built at the end of a barrel of a gun.”8 In the very
same speech, though, Obama praised those who “built democracy’s arsenal to
vanquish fascism, and who then built a series of alliances and a world order that
would ultimately defeat communism,”9 seeming to extol and vindicate the
previous U.S. efforts to impose democracy by force. Indeed, at least part of the
Cold War involved “hot” wars that were, in some instances, efforts to combat
communist satellite states and install “democratic” bulwarks. These two leaders’
struggles to nail down a definitive answer on whether force should ever be used
to impose democracy exemplify some of the challenges in evaluating the
practice. The goal of this note is to further unpack these legal, moral, and
political complexities and to provide the start of an answer.
Part II will address whether the use of force to impose democracy passes
international legal muster. Part III will address the practicalities and policy
3. Nation-building, here, describes using military forces to help recraft a foreign country’s
government.
4. Governor George W. Bush, The Second Gore–Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 11, 2000),
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b_p.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
5. Joe Klein, It’s Time for Extreme Peacekeeping, TIME, Nov. 24, 2003, at 25 (quoting George W.
Bush), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006280,00.html.
6. See Terry M. Neal, Bush Backs into Nation Building, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2003, available at
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1710.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
7. This is not to say that the Bush Administration did not have other goals and reasons for
invading Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly, in the wake of 9/11, a military response in Afghanistan
seemed, by most accounts, a necessary, measured retaliation. Even in Iraq there were other goals
attached, namely the destruction of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, these additional
objectives do not alter the fact that force was used for the purpose of establishing working democracies
in these nations. See Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.–Feb. 2004,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fukuyama (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
8. Sen. Barack Obama, A Way Forward in Iraq, Remarks Before the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs
(Nov.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://obama.senate.gov/speech/061120a_way_forward_in_iraq/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
9. See id.
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questions to be considered when deciding whether to impose democracy
through force. The conclusion to each of these sections will be the same: that
democracy through force is not only illegal, but also impracticable and
undesirable from a policy perspective. But the similarity between the
conclusions of Parts II and III should not lead one to believe that the debate
about imposing democracy through force is a clear-cut one. Far from it.
II
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Of the two perspectives on imposing democracy through force, the law
probably provides the more definitive answer. The United Nations Charter, a
binding, multilateral treaty, serves as the bedrock foundation governing the use
of international military force.10 In no uncertain terms, Chapter I, Article 2(4)
prohibits the use of force by states against other states. It declares that “[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”11
Moreover, the Preamble of the Charter affirms that its goals are to “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” to “maintain international
peace and security,” and to “live together in peace.”12
The Charter identifies two exceptions to this general prohibition on the use
of force. First, Chapter VII, Article 39, states that the UN Security Council shall
determine whether a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression exists.13 If the Security Council so determines, Article 42 gives it the
power to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace
and security in the event that other actions not involving armed force prove
ineffective.14 Hence, for democracy through force to be legal under this
provision of the Charter, it must be sanctioned by the Security Council.
The second exception comes in Chapter VII, Article 51, which preserves a
nation’s “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”15 By its terms, Article 51 seems to indicate that there must be an
actual, armed attack before a nation could respond in self-defense. Thus,
presumptively, for the imposition of democracy through force to be legal under
this section, it would have to be in response to an actual armed attack.16 Even

10. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 210 (2005).
11. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
12. UN Charter pmbl.
13. UN Charter art. 39.
14. UN Charter art. 42.
15. UN Charter art. 51.
16. There is some reason to believe that self-defense under Article 51 can be anticipatory in nature
and in response to imminent threats as opposed to actual attacks. See discussion infra Part II.
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then, however, the use of force would be constrained by the conditions of
necessity and proportionality,17 which are rules of customary international law.18
Necessity and proportionality would require the initial armed attack to be so
extensive as to require a regime change to extinguish the threat.19 Presumably,
examples of armed attacks that would legally justify such an extensive use of
force were those during World War II in response to expansionism by Japan
and Germany. Ostensibly, nothing short of all-out control and reforming the
Japanese and German governments would have sufficed to eliminate the threat
those nations posed. As a consequence, the Allied response arguably met the
requirements of necessity and proportionality.
In addition, there is a generally recognized right to anticipatory selfdefense.20 Prior to adoption of the UN Charter, which established the right to
self-defense outlined in Article 51, customary international law permitted a
nation to pursue a would-be aggressor before it actually attacked, and to
exercise defensive force when a threat was imminent. Following the Suez Canal
Crisis in 1956, debate emerged about whether Article 51 had extinguished
previously established customary law, including this right to anticipatory selfdefense, and about whether Article 51 includes the customary interpretation
that a nation need not wait for the would-be aggressor to actually attack, but
could instead engage when the threat was imminent.21 The debate became
largely immaterial, however, because the right to anticipatory self-defense
survives, one way or another, and was later recognized as extant during the Six
Day War. When debating whether the Israeli attack on Egypt during the Six
Day War of 1967 was justified under Article 51, the UN General Assembly
seemed to recognize the right to anticipatory self-defense.22 This debate
surrounding the Six Day War convinced many to interpret Article 51 as
sanctioning the use of force in “anticipatory self-defense, whe[n] an attack was

17. The requirement for such restraint was a part of the original formulation surrounding
anticipatory self-defense as formulated by Daniel Webster after the Caroline affair. See infra notes 25–
26 and accompanying text.
18. Customary international law exists or is created when two criteria are met. The first is an
objective criterion that focuses on whether there is general and consistent state practice. The second,
more subjective criterion, known as opinio juris, requires that the state action in question be taken out
of a sense of legal obligation. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously: A
Classical Approach to International Law on the Use of Force, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON THE USE OF FORCE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 9, 13 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti
eds., 2005).
19. See O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 278–79 (referring to an ICJ advisory opinion discussing the
“well established” rules of necessity and proportionality).
20. Stephen J. Cox, Comment: Confronting Threats Through Unconventional Means: Offensive
Information Warfare as a Covert Alternative to Preemptive War, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 881, 903 (“That
customary international law recognized this right [of anticipatory self-defense] well before Article 51
existed is not debated.”).
21. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. ed., 2d ed. 1991); see also
O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246 (examining the concept of imminence after Israel’s Six Day War).
22. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246; Cox, supra note 20, at n.141.
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imminent or occurring, even if it had not yet occurred.”23 Hence, either as a
matter of surviving custom or under Article 51, anticipatory self-defense is still
a legitimate use of force under international law. Whether the right of
anticipatory self-defense exists as a result of custom or by adoption of Article 51
is significant only to the extent that custom would limit it to individual selfdefense, whereas the Charter would establish a right of collective self-defense.
The key inquiry regarding anticipatory self-defense, whether it be under the
Charter itself or under customary international law, is whether the attack is
imminent. A hard-and-fast rule is hard to craft, but some examples help
illustrate the outer edges of what is “imminent.” The principle of anticipatory
self-defense was born out of a dispute between the United States and Britain in
1837, when the British attacked a private U.S. vessel, the Caroline.24 At the time,
the British were at war with Canada and suspected the Caroline of bringing
munitions to Canadian insurgents. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
claimed that the only way to justify an anticipatory attack of this kind was if the
“necessity of self-defence [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation”25 Webster further contended that the
response must entail “nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified
by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it.”26 British Minister of Defense Lord Ashburton seemed to
agree on the standard of imminence, but disagreed as to exactly what events or
behavior constituted “imminence”—he claimed the situation of the Caroline fit
Webster’s description of what justified anticipatory self-defense “in as high a
degree as [did] any case of a similar description in the history of nations.”27
Nevertheless, Webster’s formulation of imminence became woven into the
fabric of customary international law.
The debate about the standard’s scope reemerged a century later in 1967
with Israel’s military response to Egypt’s military build-up along its border just
prior to the Six Day War. The military build-up and posturing by Egypt was
seen by most of the international community as justifying Israel’s attack: the
threat to Israel was imminent enough.28 But the Security Council condemned

23. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246.
24. See Wolf Schäfer, Learning from Recent History, Provost’s Lecture on Global Issues at Stony
Brook University n.2 (Oct. 15, 2003), http://www.sunysb.edu/globalhistory/PreventiveWar.shtml;
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in the
Age of Disequilibrium, 100 A.J.I.L. 88, 101 (2006).
25. Anthony Dworkin, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-intro.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2008) (quoting Daniel Webster); see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 355–56
(3d ed. 2002) (discussing Webster’s now “classic statement”).
26. Schäfer, supra note 24, at n.2 (quoting Daniel Webster).
27. Letter from Lord Ashburton, British Minister of Defense, to Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of
State (July 28, 1842), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br1842d.htm#intro.
28. See O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246.
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Israel’s subsequent attack and the destruction of a nearly completed Iraqi
nuclear reactor as unjustified—no imminent threat had existed.29
Though no bright line exists between what is and is not imminent, these and
other examples30 demonstrate a general consensus that a visible mobilization of
military forces constitutes an imminent threat, but simply building nuclear
reactors or less-threatening weapons arguably does not. For the imposition of
democracy through force to be justified as anticipatory self-defense, then, a
nation would have to demonstrate that the absence of democracy, or the state’s
failed or rogue status, posed an imminent threat to its security, one so massive
as to justify total regime change. Given how “imminent threat” has so far been
interpreted, it would be extremely difficult, even under the most liberal
interpretation, to justify such an attack as anticipatory self-defense.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has offered a
more expansive view of imminent threat and armed attack as a basis for
invoking the right to anticipatory self-defense. The National Security Council
(NSC) argues in its 2002 report, The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, that the concept of imminent threat must be adapted to deal
with rogue states and terrorists who do not employ conventional means.31 The
NSC further contends that as the size of the threat or the magnitude of the
harm expands, the need for certainty that the attack will occur correspondingly
decreases. Moreover, given that a missile could be fired from the Middle East
and reach the United States in a matter of minutes, the threshold or imminence
of the threat is heightened. Witness the birth of the “Bush Doctrine” and its
focus on merging anticipatory self-defense with the principle of preemption.
Indeed, as early as the Afghanistan conflict, “[U.S.] officials and decisionmakers who sought to solve the Afghanistan problem inflated the principle of
self-defense so that international law would not be constrained by matters of
temporal limitation, such as the imminence of future attacks or the need for
immediacy required to repel an actual attack.”32 In justifying the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, the Bush Administration relied in part on Iraq’s alleged build-up of
weapons of mass destruction, its support of terrorists, and the rogue nature of
Saddam Hussein’s leadership as posing a sufficiently imminent threat.33 The
Administration used this alleged threat of Iraq to justify not only initial U.S.
attacks, but also the regime change that ensued and U.S. efforts to install
29. See S.C. Res. 487 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981), as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra
note 10, at 252–53.
30. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory
Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNT’L L. & POL. 1, 29 (discussing how the U.S.
blockade was a use of force, but was generally accepted by the Security Council as justified in response
to the imminent threat posed by nuclear warheads in Cuba).
31. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
32. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 380 (2004).
33. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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democracy. According to the contemporary U.S. government interpretation,
therefore, democracy through force is legally justified whenever a state
postured similarly to Iraq or Afghanistan exists.
The extent to which the Bush interpretation of preemption is international
law, however, is questionable. The U.S. action in Iraq, though supported by the
Coalition of the Willing, was not endorsed by the Security Council and was
condemned by much of the international community.34 This lack of consensus,
and the dearth of other uses of force justified rhetorically on similar grounds,
indicate that the Bush Doctrine, as embodied in the 2002 National Security
Strategy, has not reached the level of widespread practice or opinio juris
necessary to be considered customary international law. As a result, democracy
through force, without more, is probably still illegal under international law.
Another potential avenue for legally justifying the imposition of democracy
through force is as a response to humanitarian crises. Although the Charter
does not explicitly authorize interventions to alleviate humanitarian crises,
there is some debate as to whether either pre-Charter- or newly developed
international custom permits it. Pre-Charter humanitarian interventions are
numerous, including interventions by France, Britain, and Russia against
Turkish massacres of Greeks in 1830; the intervention in 1860 by Austria,
France, Britain, and others in Syria; and the 1877 Russian intervention in
Turkey in response to Turkey’s persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe.35
Whether these and other instances of humanitarian interventions constitute
customary international law is far from clear. Many scholars think they do;36
other scholars do not.37 What matters more than the intellectual community’s
acceptance of the practice of humanitarian intervention is government practice
and acceptance. Such international acceptance is hard to gauge, and that
ambiguity makes the argument that humanitarian intervention is established
law difficult to maintain.38 Indeed, it is doubtful that the pre-Charter
interventions were taken out of a sense of legal obligation.39 Further, in many
cases, humanitarian interventions—such as those in Greece, Syria, and

34. Richard Stevenson & Warren Hoge, Bush, and Allies Will Meet to Seek Ways to Sway U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at A1; Chirac Says France Will Veto U.N. Resolution on Iraq, ONLINE
NEWSHOUR, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq_03-10-03.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2008).
35. Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for
Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore
ed., 1974), as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 306–15.
36. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 307–08 (listing scholars such as “Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton,
Heiberg, Woolsey, Bluntschli, Westlake” (quoting Manouchehr Ganji)).
37. Id. (listing scholars Ganji and Brownlie); see also Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 35, at 217, as reprinted in O’CONNELL,
supra note 10, at 299–306.
38. PETER MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE USE
OF FORCE 11 (1993).
39. See Brownlie, supra note 37, as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 300–01.
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Turkey—were accompanied by ulterior motives as the balance of power in
Europe was shifting.40
Assuming arguendo that pre-Charter custom did authorize humanitarian
intervention, the question remains whether that custom survived the Charter.
Some argue that given the Charter’s main purposes—to maintain peace and
protect human rights—humanitarian interventions are still legal, even though
the Charter does not specifically authorize them. Others contend that the
Charter bans the use of force only to the extent that it affects the “territorial
integrity” or “political independence” of the state against which force is
directed.41 Further, especially since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian
interventions have become increasingly frequent—notable examples being
Kosovo and, albeit belatedly, Rwanda. Nevertheless, the international
community seems to lack a strong degree of consensus on the issue. It would be
hard to say that the practice has become so ubiquitous as to entrench it in the
law or that when nations did intervene, they did so out of a sense of legal (as
opposed to moral) obligation. The questions and scrutiny surrounding NATO’s
activities in the Balkans during the 1990s exemplify the lack of crystallization
required for a custom to take shape.42 Moreover, the world community’s
reluctance to intervene militarily in the Sudan indicates that, despite an
ostensible genocide, much of the world views unilateral humanitarian
intervention as lacking the force of law. The world community is reticent to act
in the absence of Security Council approval.43
Thus, it is doubtful that humanitarian interventions represent valid
expressions of the use of force under international law. But even if they did,
they would still be limited by the just-war requirements of proportionality and
necessity, which apply equally to measures of humanitarian intervention and
self-defense.44 This is to say, even if intervening were legal, imposing a new
regime would be acceptable only when the local government was incapable of
changing its behavior. In many circumstances—such as Rwanda—total regime

40. Id.; MALANCZUK, supra note 38, at 7.
41. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4; See also Lillich, supra note 35, as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra
note 10, at 308; AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL
CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120–21 (1979).
42. See DANA H. ALLIN, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATO’S BALKAN
INTERVENTIONS, 347 ADELPHI PAPERS 57–59 (2002); Anup Shah, The Kosovo Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES,
Jan. 21, 2001, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Kosovo.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2008)
(demonstrating the widespread and divergent debate surrounding the legality of force in the face of
humanitarian crises and how crystallization of custom has occurred as a result).
43. TED DAGNE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUDAN: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS,
PEACE TALKS, TERRORISM, AND U.S. POLICY 7 (2006), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/
RL33574.pdf. There may be other geopolitical reasons why countries such as the United States have
been unwilling to act in Sudan. Such reasons include hope for a peaceful settlement, involvement by the
African Union, and fears of American military overstretch.
44. Eric A. Heinze, Waging War for Human Rights: Toward a Moral Legal Theory of
Humanitarian Intervention, 3 HUM. RTS. & HUM. WELFARE 83, 85 (2003), available at
http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2003/heinze-2003.pdf.
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change will be the only plausible option. In others, perhaps a more limited
intervention is possible.
That said, there seems to be an emerging body of practice and belief that in
some situations—when the atrocities are so egregious—nations should not sit
around idly waiting for Security Council authorization before acting. And in
some instances, working to reinstall a more benevolent government,
presumably a democratic one, will be the only tenable path forward. Indeed, in
the wake of NATO’s unauthorized aerial attacks on Serbia, then-Secretary–
General of the UN, Kofi Annan, said,
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of
force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask—not in the context
of Kosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up
to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi
population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition
45
have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?

This rhetorical question no doubt provides its own answer. Unilateral or
multilateral action in these circumstances, though perhaps not authorized by the
letter or by customary law, would have nevertheless been acceptable. The
difficulty is determining when such an atrocity is occurring, and, of course, who
is to make that determination. Certainly not the UN—that is the very body that
Annan recognizes was too slow to act. Allowing nations to decide unilaterally
when the situation necessitates, first, intervention and, second, the completion
of the job by installing a new government, opens up a fairly large loophole in
international law for the use of force with no potential check except the
opprobrium of the international community. In many cases such opprobrium
may be sufficient; in others, perhaps not. Certainly, world opinion had staying
power—even for the United States in the context of Iraq. Although ultimately
the Bush Administration flouted the Security Council, it mounted an intense
campaign and delayed action to try and appease the international community
and gain as much rhetorical, if not military, support as possible.46
Nevertheless, under current international law, except perhaps in the most
extreme “dark days and hours,” might does not make right. The UN Charter’s
prohibition on the use of force applies equally to force used to impose
democracy, however noble the purpose. If the Security Council authorizes the
action, it is, of course, legal. If the use of force is in response to a massive
invasion or attack by a hostile state, such as those witnessed during the Second
World War, it would arguably be legal to retaliate and impose a new rule of law.
If the Bush Doctrine gains wider acceptance in the international community,
then perhaps the doctrine of preemption will authorize democracy through

45. Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), quoted in Reisman, supra note 1, at 521.
46. See, e.g., How Powell’s Evidence Compares to Findings from Prior Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2003, at A11; Powell: Iraq Hiding Weapons, Aiding Terrorists, CNN ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.un (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (illustrating efforts the
United States undertook to persuade the international community).
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force, though it would still be limited by the principle of proportionality. But
until then, absent Security Council authorization or an armed attack, imposing
democracy through force is illegal under international law.
III
POLICY PERSPECTIVE
The question whether might makes right has been answered in the negative
from a legal perspective. Although strong arguments support it, imposing
democracy through force is similarly undesirable from a policy perspective. The
main arguments in its support are aligned along two different themes—one
liberal, one conservative. The liberal theme focuses on the humanitarian aims of
imposing democracy—giving people political and economic freedom. The more
conservative theme revolves around security—reducing, in the short-term, any
direct threat posed by dictators hostile to democratic interests and, in the long
term, leading to a more interdependent, democratic world that is less likely to
engage in warfare. The policy arguments opposed to imposing democracy
through force focus on the principles of sovereignty and pluralism, as well as on
the obstacles to actually being successful at bringing about democracy. Finally,
the risks of violence and immediate loss of lives are obvious and compelling
reasons why the policy is undesirable.
A. Why Might Should Make Right
The conservative argument for supporting a policy of permitting the
imposition of democracy through force is that it enhances security for the
already democratic world. As Francis Fukuyama has described it, “[t]he fact is
that the chief threats to us and to world order come today from weak, collapsed,
or failed states. Weak or absent government institutions in developing countries
form the thread linking terrorism, refugees, AIDS, and global poverty.”47
According to Fukuyama and other pro-interventionists, the only way to turn
these “weak” states into stable ones that no longer pose military threats,
terrorism threats, or AIDS threats is to intervene and establish cure-all
democratic institutions. To Fukuyama, democracy, once in place, will lead to a
more peaceful, stable country: “A lot now rides on our ability not just to win
wars but to help create self-sustaining democratic political institutions and
robust market-oriented economies, and not only in these two countries
[Afghanistan and Iraq] but throughout the Middle East.”48
There are a few problems with Fukuyama’s view that the existence of failed
states justifies intervention to impose democracy. For starters, it is difficult to
ascertain both when a state is truly failed or weak enough to pose a significant
threat to the international community and who is responsible for making that

47. Fukuyama, supra note 7.
48. Id.
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determination.49 If individual states are able to act unilaterally to impose
democracy, then without question the door is opened for opportunism as
nations that seek to gain from the invasion are confronted with few obstacles.
Moreover, whereas intervention in unstable and potentially dangerous states
may reduce some security risks, invasion also creates new, often moredangerous risks. The war in Iraq demonstrates that although one threat
(Saddam Hussein) was removed, the war sparked sectarian violence and, by
destabilizing a country, created a terrorist training and recruiting ground.50 As
recognized by the National Intelligence Estimate, the war in Iraq has served as
a rallying cry for radical Muslims and as a powerful recruiting tool, increasing
the threat of attack against the United States.51 Violence and war often create
opportunities for other security and humanitarian threats such as the spread of
disease52 and refugee camps.53 Moreover, conflict often inevitably leads to food
shortages as economies slow or stop in order to cope with the violence.
Nevertheless, those advocating the imposition of democracy through force
point to the internationally recognized effects of democracy in promoting
individual liberty and economic development. In 1998, then-Secretary-General
Kofi Annan issued a report entitled “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,”54 which focused on
and emphasized the crucial role democracy can play in cultivating “an
environment where peace and development can flourish.”55 No doubt
establishing democratic governance is a laudable goal, and the economic
interdependence often associated with it can lead to a more peaceful world.56
49. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L. L. &
POL’Y 903, 906 (1997).
50. See generally DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, DECLASSIFIED KEY JUDGMENTS OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE “TRENDS IN GLOBAL TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES” DATED APRIL 2006 2, http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/
terrorism/keyjudgments_092606.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., ANTHONY ZWI & PILAR RAMOS-JIMENEZ, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO], CONFLICT, CRISIS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE (2004), http://www.who.int/tdr/publications/
tdrnews/news68/conflict.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
53. See, e.g., KURT MILLS, THE FIVE COLLEGE PROGRAM IN PEACE AND WORLD SECURITY
STUDIES,
REFUGEES,
FORCIBLE
DISPLACEMENT,
AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY,
http://pawss.hampshire.edu/ topics/refugees/index.html#refugees (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
54. UN Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and
Sustainable Development in Africa, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, UN
Doc. S/1998/318, A/52/871 (Apr. 13, 1998), construed in Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The
Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in
Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 322 (1998).
55. Id. ¶ 77; see also Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 54, at 322.
56. See Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, in CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR: ARGUMENTS
ON CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE 232, 232–33 (Richard K. Betts ed., 2d ed. 2002). See Thomas L.
Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 248–75 (1st
Anchor Books ed. 2000), for a discussion of the “Golden Arches theory” of conflict prevention and
how free markets, which are often but not always associated with democracies, increase the cost of
going to war. Friedman also discusses how the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was the only modern
example of economically integrated nations attacking each other, much less a democracy attacking
another democracy. Of course, Yugoslavia’s democratic credentials under Milosevic are highly suspect.
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Indeed, U.S. Presidents as different as Ronald Reagan57 and Bill Clinton58 have
emphasized that democracies tend not to wage war against each other; both
Presidents considered democracy-promotion an important “pillar” of their
foreign policies. That the spread of mature democracies helps reduce conflict,
promote economic development, and increase individual liberty, however, does
not necessarily mean that the best means by which to bring about democracy is
through force. It is inherently contradictory and oxymoronic to say that the best
way to create a peaceful, secure world is through conflict. Moreover, an
empirical study conducted by Mansfield and Snyder reveals that nations which
take quick leaps from autocracy, or even a mixed democratic–autocratic regime,
to democracy are more likely to engage in international conflict than are
autocracies.59 As Mansfield and Snyder’s evidence indicates, though a world of
mature democracies “would be safer and preferable,” promoting democracy too
rashly—much less imposing it—may create more danger, at least in the short
term, than it alleviates.60
A conservative argument for opposing U.S. intervention abroad—one that
heralds back as far as the Monroe Doctrine—is that the United States will be
more secure at home if it focuses on securing its own borders and region rather
than meddling in the affairs of other governments and attempting to eradicate
threats abroad. Henry Kissinger has noted, “No other nation has ever advanced
such goals [as humanitarian intervention or forcibly imposed democracy], which
risk maneuvering the United States and its allies into the role of world
policeman.”61 Moving the United States into the position of a world police force
not only runs the risk of overstretching the military, but also imposes direct
security threats by putting U.S. troops in harm’s way for causes that are,
potentially, of little strategic interest. This is an unacceptable position from the
perspective of a conservative realist such as Kissinger.62
The liberal argument for supporting forcibly imposed democracy is that
government oppression results in horrible human suffering. To sit back and
watch that suffering would be inhumane. Following horrors such as the
Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, the world always says “never again”—
but atrocities such as these continue to happen. No doubt the humanitarian
argument is a powerful one in favor of using force to compel a regime change
and to install democracy. But given the legal implications of forcibly imposing
democracy,63 military action should only be used in the most egregious

57. Michael Doyle, Liberalism and Worlds Politics, in CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra
note 56, at 308 (Richard K. Betts ed., 2d ed. 2002).
58. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, in CONFLICT AFTER THE
COLD WAR, supra note 56, at 335.
59. Id. at 336–37.
60. Id.
61. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 253 (2001).
62. See id. at 253, 271 (discussing how a “global mission for the United States and on behalf of
humanitarian and moral values . . . risks an even more sweeping overextension” of U.S. military forces).
63. See supra Part I.
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situations. And even then, force should be used only to the extent necessary to
avert disaster. If that means overturning the government and setting up a new
one, so be it. But if not, then a nation’s sovereignty should be respected to
whatever extent possible. Obviously there will be differences of opinion as to
whether action should be taken and how far such action should go. Unilateral
action raises a dangerous specter of lawlessness and a lack of respect for
sovereignty, which is the cornerstone of international peace. Yet, as thenSecretary-General Annan pointed out, the UN is often too slow. Regardless of
who ultimately makes the decision to authorize attack, though, it should only be
made in the rarest and most horrible circumstances.
These arguments in favor of imposing democracy through force are not
without significant merit. Certainly a world full of democracies would likely be
a much more stable, peaceful one. It would likely also be one in which there is
less oppression and more protection for individual freedom. The benefits are
vitiated, however, by the enormous costs and the fact that, as a means of
change, force is unlikely to be successful in reaching its objective.
B. Why Right Should Make Might
John F. Kennedy once said,
[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—
that we are only six percent of the world’s population—that we cannot impose our will
upon the other [ninety-four] percent of [human]kind—that we cannot right every
wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American
64
solution to every world problem.

These words embody two of the main arguments for opposing the forcible
imposition of democracy. The first is that the United States, or the West in
general, does not have a monopoly on good ideas or effective ways to govern
and solve problems. The second is that even if the West were so enlightened, it
does not have the resources to enforce democracy in the rest of the world.
Kennedy’s first point emphasizes that the notion of forcibly imposing
democracy brings with it more than just a hint of western arrogance.
Democracy no doubt holds a promise of political enfranchisement and equality,
and for many nations it has been the primary tool for ensuring such inalienable
rights as those recognized in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.65
Further, when western-style democracy and the freedoms associated with it are
juxtaposed to “wicked and violent” regimes, democracy might understandably
be seen as the obvious and only replacement.66 But as easy as it is to recognize
the shortfalls of an existing regime, “[i]t is difficult and indeed culturally
arrogant to determine what sort of contextually workable regime should replace
64. Address in Seattle at the University of Washington’s 100th Anniversary Program, 1961 PUB.
PAPERS 724, 726 (Nov. 16, 1961), quoted in Nagan & Hammer, supra note 32, at 375.
65. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 8 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2008).
66. Reisman, supra note 1, at 522.
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it.”67 Those who would impose democracy must recognize that “their own model
may not fit the local political culture or cultures.”68 After all, Leon Trotsky
believed that once people around the globe saw the sublimity of Bolshevism,
they would overthrow their current governments and transform them into
communist ones.69 This same “democratic Trotskyism” exists today.70 But by
assuming that democracy is a panacea—the “be all and end all”—prointerventionists ignore a host of countervailing factors that may make
democracy unworkable. Such factors include religion, language, culture,
nationalism, and other types of identity.71 Democratic Trotskyism ignores that
the people of a given country may have different traditions or ideas that may be
more suitable to their culture, religion, or other attributes than western-style
representative democracy.
This sort of cultural-pluralism argument against universally imposing
democracy runs the risk of turning into an Orientalist argument—one that sees
Islam and democracy as incompatible, or that perceives people inexperienced
with democracy as incapable of fully navigating its privileges.72 But certainly
Islam, as a religion and a larger cultural influence, can co-exist with
representative democracy. Turkey, secular as it has become, demonstrates the
compatibility between democracy and Islam. Indeed, when it comes to suffrage
and women’s rights, Turkey has been ahead of the western curve. Women in
Turkey were granted the right to vote and to be elected to municipal offices in
1930, and in 1934 they gained the right to run and vote in all elections. 73 In
France, women were not given the right to vote until 1944, and in Switzerland,
not until 1971.74 That Islam and democracy can be compatible, however, does
not mean that they are the most compatible or that where additional ethnic and
cultural differences may be at play, democracy is workable—at least when
imposed by an outsider.
Those advocating the forcible imposition of democracy respond by arguing
that democracy is culturally neutral:
Critics of nation-building point out that outsiders can never build nations, if that
means creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people
together as a nation. What we are really talking about is state-building—that is,
creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 522–23.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Reisman, supra note 1, at 523.
For more on “Orientalism” and how the West views the Middle- and Far East, see generally
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books ed., 1979).
73. Turkey Marks 72nd Anniversary of Women’s Suffrage, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=61002 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008); InterParliamentary Union [IPU], Women’s Suffrage: A World Chronology of the Recognition of Women’s
Rights to Vote and to Stand for Election, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2007) [hereinafter IPU, Women’s Suffrage].
74. IPU, Women’s Suffrage, supra note 73.
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judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and educations systems, and
75
the like.

But state institutions do not exist in a vacuum separate from the cultural norms
that surround them. The U.S. experiment with democracy is a testament to the
fact that democratic institutions and ideals are slowly woven into the fabric of
society and culture—they are not wholly separate. Indeed, elementary history
and civics lessons taught in the United States ingrain in children the stories—
the shared culture—of Martin Luther King, the Boston Tea Party, the Civil
Rights Movement, and so forth. These lessons together teach U.S. citizens how
democracy arose from and out of our cultural history; they are a part of what
Benedict Anderson has dubbed our “imagined community.”76
To be sure, the whole of western progress from the Renaissance and
Enlightenment forward is envisioned now, in retrospect, as part of an almost
inevitable movement toward freedom that resulted in the democratic
institutions the United States cherishes today. To say that democracy is
somehow distinct from the most basic aspects of U.S. culture would fly in the
face not only of our education, but also of the community beliefs that go into
making the United States a nation. Again, this is not to say that countries
without histories of democracies cannot create them, but those democratic
movements stand a much better chance of success if they are indigenous and
have some relationship to the nation’s identity and history. This idea that
democracy works best when it comes from the ground up coincides well with
Mansfield and Snyder’s argument that the focus, at least for the United States,
should not be on imposing democracy, but rather on helping democratic
movements manage the instability and potential for conflict that comes with
change in political systems. For example, the United States could help by
providing “golden parachutes” for former elites threatened by democracy,77 or
employment for “communist nomenklatura, military officer corps, nuclear
scientists, and smokestack industrialists.”78 This is to say, it could help by
providing incentives for those with a strong stake in the old regimes (and hence
a strong stake in making a transition to democracy difficult) to embrace
democracy.
Certainly there are examples of the forcible imposition of democracy that
have been relatively successful—even in countries that were relatively
unaffiliated with the democratic experience. Post–World War II Japan is a
notable example. However, the Japanese transformation to democracy was
successful in part because significant Japanese cultural institutions were left

75. Fukuyama, supra note 7.
76. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991). Anderson describes the
process by which “nations” are conceived in the minds of their nationals by relying on history, tales,
written text, and other traditions that serve to bond people who have never met into a greater
community of common, or at least imagined, interests.
77. Mansfield & Snyder, supra note 58, at 346 (“Democratization was least likely to lead to war
when the old elites saw a reasonably bright future for themselves in the new social order.”).
78. Id. at 347.
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intact.79 It is doubtful, given the Japanese people’s loyalty to Emperor Hirohito,
that the transition would have been so smooth without his consent to the
surrender.80 Moreover, the Emperor’s royal position, one of the key cultural
institutions, was allowed to live on—albeit in a neutered form.81 It was this
neutering of the revered Emperor’s place in Shintoism that prevented the
previously engendered kamikaze fanaticism from turning into the sort of
insurgency and religious fanaticism that is now wreaking havoc in Iraq. Many in
the West called for the Emperor to be tried for war crimes, but MacArthur
refused because he knew that Japan would be easier to rule with the Emperor
left in power, at least nominally.82
It is also questionable whether the Japanese democratic experience would
have been successful had it not been for the quick rise of China after the war,
which forced Japan to rely on its western allies to counterbalance the emerging
Maoist juggernaut.83 Further, Japan remains to this day a marginally “occupied”
nation.84 United States military forces are stationed throughout the Japanese
islands, and the Japanese constitution, for all intents and purposes written by
MacArthur and the Allied Powers,85 continues to forbid Japanese offensive
forces.86 Finally, democracy was not a completely foreign system in Japan prior
to the end of the war. Indeed, in the 1920s, before the militarist takeover, Japan
had a parliamentary system.87 Without question this exposure, short-lived as it
was, aided the transition.
In postwar Germany, the transition to democracy was also greatly aided by
a democratic tradition preexisting the war. Germans were familiar and well
acquainted with the democratic experiment. Indeed, Hitler himself ran for
office on several occasions and as a result of the Nazi’s parliamentary strength
79. ROBERT HARVEY, AMERICAN SHOGUN: MACARTHUR, HIROHITO AND THE AMERICAN
DUEL WITH JAPAN 314–20 (2006); Chalmers Johnson, Iraq Is Not Japan, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK,
Jan. 27, 2003, http://hnn.us/articles/1225.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
80. HARVEY, supra note 79, at 314–20; Frank Gibney Sr., Emperor Hirohito: Japan’s Wartime
Monarch Outlived His Role as God-King, But He Oversaw the Nation’s Modern Transformation, TIME
ASIA, Aug. 23, 1999, at 60.
81. See NIHON-KOKU KENP [Constitution] ch. I (Japan), translation available at
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html#CHAPTER_I; see also
J.A.A. STOCKWIN, DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN POLITICS OF JAPAN 33 (2003).
82. Gibney, supra note 80.
83. Johnson, Iraq Is Not Japan, supra note 79.
84. Sheila A. Smith, A Place Apart: Okinawa and Japan’s Postwar Peace, in PARTNERSHIP: THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 1951–2001, at 179, 180–81 (Akira Iriye & Robert A. Wampler eds., 2001);
CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN POL’Y RES. INST., MILITARY COLONIALISM IN OKINAWA, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20061208002516/http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/johnson.htm
(last
visited Sept. 2, 2007).
85. 2 DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 518–49 (2002); see also PBS, Creation of the Japanese Constitution
(1945–1946), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX102.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2006) (demonstrating MacArthur’s and the United States’ considerable involvement in
writing the Japanese Constitution, albeit with Japanese input).
86. NIHON-KOKU KENP ch. II, art. 9 (Japan).
87. STOCKWIN, supra note 81, at XV–XVI; Mansfield & Snyder, supra note 58, at 347; Johnson,
Iraq Is Not Japan, supra note 79.
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was eventually appointed as Chancellor, paving the way for his eventual
consolidation of power.88 Unfortunately, the Germans had also seen how
quickly democracy could be turned on its head and its freedoms usurped. Like
Japan, Germany remained democratic, in part, because Allied forces continued
to occupy it through the end of the Cold War and still maintain a military
presence there today. That sort of long-lasting occupation is untenable now,
and, indeed, it is undesirable—untenable because it saps the interventionists of
military and economic resources and undesirable because it continues, at least
to a degree, to limit a nation’s control of not only its own territory, but also its
own destiny.
Although democracy imposed through force has been successful in the past,
that success depended on several factors: the particular, democratic histories of
the nations being transformed, the extensiveness of the military occupations,
competing geopolitical forces such as the Cold War, the lack or at least the
curtailment of religious-type fervor, more widespread international
commitment to the particular military occupations, and more widespread
commitment from the home populations of the “occupiers.”89 But on an even
more fundamental and abstract level, the idea of “imposing” anything on a
group of people is antithetical to the cornerstone of democracy—that the
people should choose their government. Not only do these competing ideas not
mesh well in theory; it is often even worse in practice. Iraq is a telling example.
At times, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) paternally held
the Iraqis’ hands as they tried to determine what Iraqi democracy would look
like; at other times, the CPA dictated what the new government would be.90 For
instance, the CPA selected the twenty-five members of the Iraqi Governing
Council,91 and it selected the members of its replacement, the Iraqi Interim
Government.92 Indeed, some have questioned whether the U.S. occupation
abided by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention by
not leaving the legal, political, and economic structures of the occupied territory
intact.93
It could be said that the West’s drafting of the Japanese constitution has
worked fairly well. But was it a product of democracy? No. It was a product of
outside intervention. How can a democracy retain its legitimacy if its foundation
was not formed from a democratic process? Truth be told, democracy elsewhere
will have an uphill battle. Japan was able to win that battle, in part, because of

88. WILFRIED FEST, DICTIONARY OF GERMANY HISTORY: 1806–1945 69 (1978).
89. These last two distinguishing characteristics, and how they contribute to imposing democracy
through force unlikely to be successful today, are discussed in further detail below. See discussion infra
Part III.
90. See Gregory Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 202–04 (2005).
91. Id. at 204.
92. Id. at 226.
93. Id. at 234–37.
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its previous democratic governance—democracy was indigenous rather than
foisted upon it.94
The imposition of a new form of government, aside from being in tension
with the very idea of democracy, also creates practical obstacles because it soon
engenders resentment among the local populations. Even in situations where
the invasion and toppling of a brutal dictator are welcomed by the people of a
country, “[a]n army of liberation becomes an army of occupation the moment it
wins. As an army of occupation, it encounters more and more resistance the
longer it stays.”95 As time passes, populations become less tolerant of outside
armed forces and view them as hostile to their interests. Especially in countries
with histories of subjugation and colonialism, such as those in the Middle East
and Africa, the return of western troops is likely to be viewed with skepticism.
The recent Iraq conflict bears this out. As the army of liberation rode into
Baghdad, the people were jubilant and welcomed the Coalition.96 But as time
has dragged on and the economic and security situations have not improved,
more and more animus has been directed, often violently, toward Coalition
forces.
The protracted stay, not to mention the invasion itself, irritates and angers
the local population because it is an affront to their nation’s sovereignty. But
aside from creating local opposition to the occupying force—a practical
problem—the usurpation of sovereignty is also a philosophical problem for prointerventionists. Sovereignty is one of the guiding principles of the international
system, and respect for it has helped foster a peaceful world since the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648.97 On a macro level, sovereignty recognizes a nation’s ability
to direct its own course and to protect the sanctity of its territory. On a micro
level, by allowing the nation this freedom, the principle of sovereignty also
recognizes the right of individuals within that nation to choose their own
government. If a nation has an oppressive regime, then sovereignty may still
protect the nation’s ability to be independent, but it risks neglecting the
individual’s freedom. But imposing democracy also imposes a certain system of
governance on individuals. Moreover, given the major obstacles to success for
interventionists and the unlikelihood that individuals will be fully enfranchised

94. Johnson, Iraq Is Not Japan, supra note 79.
95. Reisman, supra note 1, at 523.
96. Susan Chira, Invasion Is Easy. Occupation Is Hard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, § 4, at 6.
97. This is not to say that the particular regime of sovereignty established by Westphalia was
desirable. Without question it created its own set of problems, the most significant of which was an
array of rivalries. Rather, the discussion of sovereignty is meant to highlight that such respect for the
territorial integrity of another nation has, for the most part, engendered stability in international
relations. The importance of sovereignty is further evidenced by its recognition in Article 2 of the UN
Charter. See Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International Intervention, State
Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 1, 5–10 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995)
(discussing the origins and importance of sovereignty in international law); STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, SOVEREIGNTY (2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (outlining the basic concept and importance of sovereignty).
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in the new regime, the affront to a nation’s sovereignty is not worth the risk.
With each incursion on sovereignty, the international balance of power and rule
of law are chipped away, removing one of the main obstacles to war.
The difficulties associated with forcefully imposing democracy dovetail into
the second of John F. Kennedy’s points: that even if the United States has all
the right ideas, it does not have the resources to do the job.98 The ease with
which the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” were able to
overthrow the Ba’athist regime and penetrate Baghdad speaks volumes about
U.S. global military supremacy. But toppling the previous regime is only the
start of the battle. As of mid-December 2006, Congress had appropriated $379
billion for the conflict in Iraq.99 And in the final weeks of 2006, President Bush
requested an additional $100 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan.100 These numbers
have and will continue to climb. This of course does not include the additional
contributions from the Coalition. Moreover, it does not count the human costs.
More than 3,000 U.S. troops have died in the Iraqi conflict. Both the economic
strain and western constituencies’ impatience with seeing their soldiers die in
battle—especially a battle that may not be of any strategic interest to the
intervener—mean that an intervening government has a very short leash and a
limited ability to engage in protracted regime changes designed to result in
democracy. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it, “[I]t is an arduous undertaking to
excite the enthusiasm of a democratic nation for any theory which does not
have a visible, direct, and immediate bearing on the occupations of their daily
lives.”101 Professor Reisman puts de Tocqueville’s argument within the context
of regime change, stating, “The process of regime change may put great strain
on the economic resources of the changer and its national economy. And the
longer and more widespread the economic strain, the more tenuous the
domestic support for regime change becomes.”102
No doubt the 2006 congressional elections and public-opinion polls are
powerful evidence for the growing domestic discontent with the prolonged war
in Iraq. A national poll conducted in August 2007 indicates that sixty-nine
percent of Americans disapproved of how the war in Iraq was being handled.103
The great irony here is that convincing the domestic populace that they have an
interest in the conflict runs in opposition to the task of convincing the
international community that the purpose of the intervention is a benevolent,
selfless one. And convincing the international community of the intervener’s
selflessness is necessary to avoid international opprobrium, which is one of the
key checks on unilateral action, especially by a superpower.
98. See supra text accompanying note 64.
99. Bush Wants $100 Billion More for Wars, Report Says, REUTERS, Dec. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.infowars.com/articles/iraq/cost_bush_wants_100b_more_for_wars.htm.
100. Id.
101. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 642 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1969), quoted in Reisman, supra note 1, at 523.
102. Reisman, supra note 1, at 523.
103. PollingReport.com, Iraq, http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2007).
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The economic and military costs associated with forcibly imposing
democracy are even more untenable today given the passionate ideological
interests of many potential adversaries and given recent developments in
military technology and tactics. The preeminent military power of the United
States enables it to obliterate a country in the blink of an eye—maybe a couple
of blinks if it is relying on conventional forces.104 It could thus control any
nation’s and virtually any individual’s fate.105 But military power does not
translate into “behavior control”; the United States has been unable to prevent
the proliferation of even the crudest of weapons, and an armed
counterinsurgency, equipped with discipline, self-sacrifice, ruthlessness, and an
intense emotional ideology, can be an insurmountable obstacle to nations
wanting to impose democracy by force.106 Nor is Iraq the only example. Both the
Shining Path in Peru107 and the Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka108 demonstrate the
potency with which a small insurrection can debilitate entire countries.109
Though guerrilla-style counterinsurgencies have gained new potency, some of
the tactics being used and the challenges insurgencies can pose are reminiscent
of the American Revolution.110 Though the colonists relied in part on
conventional warfare, they also relied on insurgent, guerilla warfare to stymie
British plans for continued occupation.111 The technological advent of car
bombs, suicide bombers, and other ingenious but heinous tactics has only
amplified the effectiveness of counterinsurgencies.
The economic and military costs associated with forcibly imposing
democracy lead to additional problems that continue to compound. As the costs
mount and more resources, including troops, are needed to win the battle, the
prospect of winning with a sufficiently large and adequately trained volunteer
force becomes less and less likely. Potential volunteers begin to believe,
wrongly or rightly, that the mission serves no domestic interest yet involves
great personal and national risks, and so they decide against enlisting. Again,
the situation in Iraq is instructive. United States generals recently called for
more troops to be sent to Iraq, arguing that without more people-power the
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U.S. armed forces are on the brink of collapse.112 Unfortunately, there are not
many more to give, as the reservists have already been sent on extended tours
and the U.S. military is on the verge of being overstretched.113 This shortage of
human resources not only decreases the chances of successfully imposing
democracy, but it also leads to a corresponding erosion of democratic freedom
at home. One form of this erosion is the threat of conscription. But democratic
freedoms are also eroded because as the conflict intensifies, so does the risk of
attack at home.114 Even if that risk does not increase once war has begun,
wartime almost inevitably leads to shrinking domestic liberties as freedom of
speech and travel are curtailed and lawmakers prioritize security over liberty.
This is not to say that during times of war it is inappropriate to alter the balance
between security and liberty, but that in the absence of prolonged conflict, the
balance permits greater liberty.115
Finally and most fundamentally, forcibly imposed democracy is going to cost
lives. Any time force is used, people will die. In some instances the cost of
action—the lives lost as a result of intervention—will be worth the lives saved.
Rwanda and World War II are clear examples. Nevertheless, the cost of
intervention should always be weighed carefully when deciding whether going
to war is the right decision. The human death toll mounts not just as a result of
bullets and bombs, but also because the conflict runs the high risk of creating
internally displaced populations and refugees, disrupting food supplies, and
spreading disease. In Iraq it is estimated that somewhere between 50,000 and
655,000 Iraqis have died, as of the beginning of 2007, as a result of the invasion
and its downstream consequences.116 Certainly there are ways to mitigate these
harms and reduce the damage done by a forceful intervention. However, given
the hurdles facing a policy of forcibly imposed democracy, the more practical
and wise solution—except perhaps in the most grave situations—is to work to
cultivate and support indigenous movements for democracy from within the
state. This not only avoids such costs as human life, loss of sovereignty, and
potential cultural imperialism, but it also helps to avoid many of the problems
associated with intervention such as resistance to outsiders, costs to the
intervener, and conflict fatigue among the intervener’s populace.
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IV
CONCLUSION
The Arthurian dilemma looms large today. The United States and other
western democracies value their freedom and their method of governance. The
desire to share democracy with those who are oppressed on a daily basis is
without question laudable. But as Henry Kissinger put it, “When moral
principles are applied without regard to historical conditions, the result is
usually an increase in suffering rather than its amelioration.”117 In other words,
good intentions should not blind us to very real and very likely obstacles. And
in the case of forcibly imposed democracy, the obstacles to trying to spread its
associated freedoms around the world loom large. In essence, the United States
or others who may want to impose democracy by force are not mighty enough
to do the job and do it well. By trying and failing, those who use force to impose
democracy may create new problems and exacerbate the conditions they were
trying to ameliorate. But even if the litany of practical problems did not exist,
the use of might to make right should be avoided because it compromises and
contradicts the very foundations, the very “rights,” that democracy values and
that the international system was built on, including pluralism, difference of
opinion, and sovereignty. This is not to say that people around the globe should
stop their efforts to expand freedom and increase the quality of global life. But
the use of force—of might—is neither an effective nor a philosophically
consistent method of doing so.
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